Abstract. We study the logical and computational properties of basic theorems of uncountable mathematics, including the Cousin and Lindelöf lemma published in 1895 and 1903. Historically, these lemmas were among the first formulations of open-cover compactness and the Lindelöf property, respectively. These notions are of great conceptual importance: the former is commonly viewed as a way of treating uncountable sets like e.g. [0, 1] as 'almost finite', while the latter allows one to treat uncountable sets like e.g. R as 'almost countable'. This reduction of the uncountable to the finite/countable turns out to have a considerable logical and computational cost: we show that the aforementioned lemmas, and many related theorems, are extremely hard to prove, while the associated sub-covers are extremely hard to compute. Indeed, in terms of the standard scale (based on comprehension axioms), a proof of these lemmas requires at least the full extent of second-order arithmetic, a system originating from Hilbert-Bernays' Grundlagen der Mathematik. This observation has far-reaching implications for the Grundlagen's spiritual successor, the program of Reverse Mathematics, and the associated Gödel hierachy. We also show that the Cousin lemma is essential for the development of the gauge integral, a generalisation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals that also uniquely provides a direct formalisation of Feynman's path integral.
1. Introduction 1.1. Infinity: hubris and catharsis. It is a commonplace that finite and countable sets exhibit many useful properties that uncountable sets lack. Conveniently, there are properties that allow one to treat uncountable sets as though they were finite or countable, namely open-cover compactness and the Lindelöf property, i.e. the statement that an open cover has a finite, respectively countable, sub-cover.
These notions are well-established: the Cousin lemma ( [14, p. 22] ) on the opencover compactness of subsets of R 2 , dates back 1 135 years, while the Lindelöf lemma ([37, p. 698]) on the Lindelöf property of R n , dates back about 115 years. Despite their basic nature, their central role in analysis, and a long history, little is known about the logical and computational properties of the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas. In a nutshell, we aim to fill this hole in the literature in this paper. We discuss our motivations and goals in detail in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
As it tuns out, the hubris of reducing the uncountable to the finite/countable as in the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas, comes at great logical and computational cost. Indeed, we establish below that these lemmas are extremely hard to prove, while the sub-covers from these lemmas are similarly hard to compute. Now, 'hardness of proof' is measured by what comprehension 2 axioms are necessary to prove the theorem. In this sense, a proof of the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas requires (comprehension axioms as strong as) second-order arithmetic, as is clear from Figure 1 , where the latter originates from Hilbert-Bernays' Grundlagen der Mathematik [29] .
Moreover, the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas are not isolated events: we provide a list of basic theorems (See Section 1.3) with the same 'extreme' logical and computational properties. Some of the listed theorems are even of great conceptual importance as they pertain to the gauge integral ( [6] ), which provides a generalisation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals, and (to the best of our knowledge) the only direct formalisation of the Feynman path integral ( [12, 42, 43] ).
By way of catharsis, our results call into question various empirical claims from the foundation of mathematics, such as the 'Big Five' classification from Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2.1) and the linear nature of the Gödel hierarchy (See Section 2.2). Nonetheless, we obtain in Section 3.3 Reverse Mathematics style equivalences involving the Cousin lemma and basic properties of the gauge integral.
Finally, Reverse Mathematics is intimately connected to classical computability theory (See e.g. [68, II.7 .5]); similarly, our results have an (almost) equivalent reformulation in higher-order computability theory, and are even (often) obtained via the latter. Furthermore, in light of this correspondence, we investigate in Section 4 the strength of the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas when combined with fundamental objects from computability theory. This study yields surprising results reaching all the way up to Gandy's superjump ( [24] ), a 'higher-order' version of Turing's Halting problem ( [73] ), the prototypical non-computable object.
Foundational and mathematical motivations.
We discuss the motivations for this paper. Items (i) and (ii) motivate the study of mathematics beyond the language of second-order arithmetic L 2 , the framework for 'classical' Reverse Mathematics, while a notable consequence is provided by item (iii).
(i) The gauge integral is a generalisation of the Lebesgue and (improper) Riemann integral, and formalises Feynman's path integral (See Section 1.2.1). The language L 2 cannot accommodate (basic) gauge integration. (ii) The foundational studies of mathematics led by Hilbert take place in a logical framework richer than the language L 2 (See Section 1.2.2). It is natural to ask if anything is lost by restricting to L 2 . (iii) The compatibility problem for Nelson's predicative arithmetic ( [47] ) was solved in the negative ( [13] ). We solve the compatibility problem for WeylFeferman predicative mathematics in the negative (See Section 1.2.3). As an example of how items (i) and (ii) are intimately related: the uniqueness of the gauge integral requires (Heine-Borel) compactness for uncountable covers. The latter compactness cannot be formulated in L 2 , and will be seen to have completely different logical and computational properties compared to the 'countable/secondorder' substitute, i.e. (Heine-Borel) compactness for countable covers.
1.2.1. Mathematical motivations. In this section, we discuss the mathematical motivations for this paper, provided by the study of the gauge integral. As will become clear, the latter cannot be (directly) formulated in the language of secondorder arithmetic, yielding a measure of motivation for our adoption of Kohlenbach's higher-order framework involving all finite types.
First of all, the gauge integral (aka Henstock-Kurzweil integral) was introduced around 1912 by Denjoy (in a different form) and constitutes a simultaneous generalisation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integral. The gauge integral provides (to the best of our knowledge) the only formal framework close to the original development of the Feynman path integral ( [12, 42, 43] ), i.e. gauge integrals are highly relevant in (the foundations of) physics. As expected, the gauge integral can handle discontinuous functions, which were around at the time: Dirichlet discusses the characteristic function of Q around 1829 in [15] , while Riemann defines a function with countably many discontinuities in his Habilitationsschrift [34] .
Secondly, since Lebesgue integration is studied in Reverse Mathematics (See [68, X.1]), it is a natural next step to study the gauge integral. However, this study cannot take place in the language of second-order arithmetic for the following reasons: on one hand (general) discontinuous functions are essential for proving basic results of the gauge integral by Remark 3.21 and Corollary 3.24. On the other hand, by Theorem 3.20, the uniqueness of the gauge integral requires the Cousin lemma ( [14, p. 22] ), which deals with uncountable covers, and the latter cannot be formulated in the language of second-order arithmetic.
In conclusion, the gauge integral seems to require a logical framework richer than second-order arithmetic. Now, this richer framework yields surprising results: the Cousin lemma expresses compactness for uncountable open covers; this lemma turns out to have completely different logical and computational properties compared to compactness restricted to countable covers as in Reverse Mathematics ([68, IV.1]).
Foundational motivations.
We show that the foundational studies of mathematics led by Hilbert took place in a framework richer than second-order arithmetic. First of all, in his 1917-1933 lectures on the foundations of mathematics ( [30] ), Hilbert used a logical system involving third-order 3 Funktionfunktionen. Ackermann's 1924 dissertation (supervised by Hilbert) starts with an overview of Hilbertsche Beweistheorie, i.e. Hilbertian proof theory, which explicitly includes third-order 3 parameters and the 'epsilon' operator.
Secondly, Hilbert and Bernays introduce 4 the formal system H in [29, Supplement IV] , and use it to formalise parts of mathematics, again based on the 'epsilon' operator. Now, Hilbert and Bernays in [29, p. 495 ] use the epsilon operator to define a certain object ξ which maps functions to functions, i.e. a third-order object. Similarly, Feferman's 'µ' operator (See Section 2.4) is defined with the same name in [29, p. 476] , while the 'ν' operator from [29, p. 479 ] is only a slight variation of the Suslin functional (See Section 2.4). Hence, one could develop large parts of Kohlenbach's higher-order Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2.3.2) in H.
Thirdly, Simpson positions Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2.1) in [68, p. 6] as a continuation of Hilbert-Bernays' research, namely as follows:
The development of a portion of ordinary mathematics within [secondorder arithmetic] Z 2 is outlined in Supplement IV of Hilbert/Bernays [. . . ] . The present book may be regarded as a continuation of the research begun by Hilbert and Bernays. In conclusion, the foundational studies of Hilbert-Bernays-Ackermann take place in a language richer than L 2 , and it is a natural foundational question if anything is lost by restricting to the latter. By Theorem 3.1, the loss can be extreme: in terms of comprehension axioms, a proof of the Cousin lemma requires a system as strong as second-order arithmetic, while this lemma restricted to countable covers/the language of second-order arithmetic is provable in a weak system by [68, IV.1].
1.2.3. Foundational consequences. We discuss the compatibility problem for predicative mathematicsà la Weyl-Fefermann. As it turns out, our results solve this problem in the negative, providing another motivation for this paper.
Russell famously identified an inconsistency in early set theory, known as Russel's paradox, based on the 'set of all sets' ( [74] ). According to Russel, the source of this paradox was circular reasoning: in defining the 'set of all sets', one quantifies over all sets, including the one that is being defined. To avoid such problems, Russel suggested banning any impredicative definition, i.e. a definition in which one quantifies over the object being defined. The textbook example of an impredicative definition is the supremum of a bounded set of reals, defined as the least upper bound of that set. Weyl, a student of Hilbert, initiated the development of predicative mathematics ( [77] ), i.e. avoiding impredicative definitions, which Feferman continued ( [18] [19] [20] ). Finally, the fourth 'Big Five' system of Reverse Mathematics is considered the 'upper limit' of predicative mathematics (See [68, §I.12] ).
In an (similar but much more strict) effort to develop mathematics based on a predicative notion of number, Nelson introduced predicative arithmetic ( [47] ). Unfortunately, predicative arithmetic suffers from the compatibility problem: If two theorems A, B are both acceptable from the point of view of predicative arithmetic, it is possible that A ∧ B is not ( [13] ). In this light, the development of predicative arithmetic seems somewhat arbitrary. It is then a natural question whether WeylFeferman predicative mathematics suffers from the same compatibility problem. We show that this is the case in Section 4.2. A detailed discussion, also explaining our notion 'acceptable in predicative mathematics', may be found in Remark 4.16.
1.3.
Overview of main results. Our main result is that, in terms of the usual scale of comprehension axioms, a proof of the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas requires a system as strong as second-order arithmetic. The same result for the other theorems in Remark 1.1 follows from our main result, as discussed in Section 3.2.2. A precise statement of our results is found at the end of this section. if for each s ∈ S there is a circle of finite non-zero radius with s as center (1.1)
In particular, any f : S → R + gives rise to a cover in the sense of the previous quote by Cousin as follows: ∪ x∈S (x − f (x), x + f (x)) covers S ⊂ R. A rich history notwithstanding, the Cousin lemma does not show its age: there are recent attempts to develop elementary real analysis with this lemma as the 'centerpiece' ( [70, 71] ).
We now make our main results precise, for which some definitions are needed. Detailed definitions may be found in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
We discuss in Remark 2.8 why Definition 1.3 furnishes the 'right' (or at least 'good') higher-order analogues of the respective second-order systems.
Our main results, to be proved in Section 3, are now as follows: (i) The Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas are provable in Z (iii) The Cousin lemma is equivalent to basic properties of the gauge integral in Kohlenbach's aforementioned framework. We discuss the (considerable) implications for the Gödel hierarchy in Section 2.2.
Finally, as noted above, Reverse Mathematics is intimately connected to computability theory, and the same holds for our results; for instance, the functional defined by (∃ 3 ) (resp. (S 2 k )) can (resp. cannot) compute, in the sense of Section 2.4, a finite sub-cover from the Cousin lemma on input an open cover of [0, 1].
Our main results in Section 4 are then as follows: inspired by the aforementioned connection, we study the interaction between the theorems from the above list and the Big Five of Reverse Mathematics given by the Suslin functional S and Feferman's search functional µ from Section 2.4. This leads to surprising results in (higher-order) Reverse Mathematics, as follows:
(1) The combination of the Cousin lemma and Feferman's µ yields transfinite recursion for arithmetical formulas, i.e. the fourth Big Five system. We derive novel theorems about Borel functions from this result. (2) The combination of the Cousin lemma and the Suslin functional S yields Gandy's superjump, the aforementioned 'higher-order' Halting problem. (3) The combination of the Lindelöf lemma for Baire space (given by a functional) and Feferman's µ yields the Suslin functional S, i.e. the fifth Big Five system, and by the previous item also Gandy's superjump.
As will become clear in Section 4.2.2, the third item solves the compatibility problem of Weyl-Feferman predicativist mathematics from Section 1.2.3 in the negative. We also point out that the Lindelöf lemma (resp. the Cousin lemma) and Feferman's µ are rather weak in isolation, and only become strong when combined.
Preliminaries
We sketch the program Reverse Mathematics in Section 2.1, discuss the associated Gödel hierarchy in Section 2.2, and introduce second-order and higher-order arithmetic in Section 2.3. As our main results are proved using techniques from computability theory, we discuss some essential elements of the latter in Section 2.4. [68] ) and others. We refer to [68] for an overview of RM and introduce the required definitions (like the 'base theory' RCA 0 ) in Section 2.3.1; we now sketch some of the aspects of RM essential to this paper.
The aim of RM is to find the axioms necessary to prove a statement of ordinary, i.e. non-set theoretical, mathematics. The classical base theory RCA 0 of 'computable mathematics', introduced in Section 2.3.1, is always assumed. Thus, the aim is:
The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms A such that RCA 0 proves [A → T ] for statements T of ordinary mathematics. Surprisingly, once the minimal A are known, we almost always also have RCA 0 ⊢ [A ↔ T ], i.e. we derive the theorem T from the axioms A (the 'usual' way of doing mathematics), but we can also derive the axiom A from the theorem T (the 'reverse' way). In light of these 'reversals', the field was baptised 'Reverse Mathematics'.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, in the majority of cases, for a statement T of ordinary mathematics, either T is provable in RCA 0 , or the latter proves T ↔ A i , where A i is one of the logical systems WKL 0 , ACA 0 , ATR 0 or Π Finally, we note that the Big Five systems of RM yield a linear order: . This hierarchy is claimed by Simpson to capture most systems that are natural and/or have foundational import, as follows.
It is striking that a great many foundational theories are linearly ordered by <. Of course it is possible to construct pairs of artificial theories which are incomparable under <. However, this is not the case for the "natural" or non-artificial theories which are usually regarded as significant in the foundations of mathematics. ([69]) Burgess makes essentially the same claims in [11, §1.5] . However, our results imply that the theorems in Remark 1.1 do not fit the Gödel hierarchy (with the latter based on inclusion 5 ). In particular, we obtain a branch that is independent of the medium range of the Gödel hierarchy, as depicted below.
Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas basic prop. of gauge integral weak Figure 1 . The Gödel hierarchy with a side-branch for the medium range 2.3.1. Second-order arithmetic and fragments. The language L 2 of second-order arithmetic Z 2 has two sorts of variables: number variables n, m, k, l, . . . intended to range over the natural numbers, and set variables X, Y, Z, . . . intended to range over sets of natural numbers. The constants of L 2 are 0, 1, < N , + N , × N , = N and ∈, which are intended to have their usual meaning (by the axioms introduced below). Formulas and terms are built up from these constants in the usual way.
Definition 2.1. Second-order arithmetic Z 2 consists of three axiom schemas:
(1) Basic axioms expressing that 0, 1, < N , + N , × N form an ordered semi-ring with equality = N . (2) Induction: For any X, 0 ∈ X ∧(∀n)(n ∈ X → n+1 ∈ X) → (∀n)(n ∈ X). (3) Comprehension: For any formula ϕ(n) of L 2 which does not involve the variable X, we have (∃X)(∀n)(n ∈ X ↔ ϕ(n)).
Induction is well-known, while comprehension intuitively expresses that any L 2 -formula ϕ(n) yields a set X = {n ∈ N : ϕ(n)} consisting of exactly those numbers n ∈ N satisfying ϕ(n). Now, fragments of Z 2 are obtained by restricting comprehension (and induction), for which the following definition is needed.
Definition 2.2. [Formula classes]
(1) A formula of L 2 is quantifier-free (Σ Using the above, the third and fifth 'Big Five' systems ACA 0 and Π 1 1 -CA 0 are just Z 2 with comprehension restricted to resp. arithmetical and Π 1 1 -formulas. Alternatively, ACA 0 allows one to build sets using finite iterations of Turing's Halting problem ( [73] ), aka the Turing jump; intuitively, ATR 0 extends this to transfinite recursion, i.e. the unbounded iteration of the Turing jump along any countable well-ordering. Furthermore, the 'base theory' RCA 0 is Z 2 with comprehension restricted to ∆ Finally, in light of the previous and (2.1), the Big Five only constitute a very tiny fragment of Z 2 ; on a related note, the RM of topology does give rise to theorems equivalent to Π 1 2 -CA 0 ( [44] ), but that is the current upper bound of RM to the best of our knowledge. In particular, if Π 1 k -CA 0 is Z 2 restricted to Π 1 k -comprehension, then this system can be said to 'go beyond Friedman-Simpson RM' for k ≥ 3.
2.3.2.
Higher-order arithmetic and fragments. As suggested by its name, higherorder arithmetic extends second-order arithmetic. Indeed, while the latter is restricted to numbers and sets of numbers, higher-order arithmetic also has sets of sets of numbers, sets of sets of sets of numbers, et cetera. To formalise this idea, we introduce the collection of all finite types T, defined by the two clauses:
(i) 0 ∈ T and (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T then (σ → τ ) ∈ T, where 0 is the type of natural numbers, and σ → τ is the type of mappings from objects of type σ to objects of type τ . In this way, 1 ≡ 0 → 0 is the type of functions from numbers to numbers, and where n + 1 ≡ n → 0. Viewing sets as given by their characteristic function, we note that Z 2 only includes objects of type 0 and 1.
The language of L ω consists of variables x ρ , y ρ , z ρ , . . . of any finite type ρ ∈ T. Types may be omitted when they can be inferred from context. The constants of L ω includes the type 0 objects 0, 1 and < 0 , + 0 , × 0 , = 0 which are intended to have the same meaning as their N-subscript counterparts in Z 2 . Equality at higher types is defined in terms of '= 0 ' as follows: for any objects x τ , y τ , we have
2) 6 To be absolutely clear, we take 'WKL' to be the L 2 -sentence every infinite binary tree has a path as in [68] , while the Big Five system WKL 0 is RCA 0 + WKL, and WKL
. Furthermore, L ω also includes the recursor constant R σ for any σ ∈ T, which allows for iteration on type σ-objects as in the special case (2.3). Formulas and terms are defined as usual. 
The axiom of extensionality: for all ρ, τ ∈ T, we have: (∀x
for any quantifier-free formula A in the language of L ω .
As discussed in [36, §2] , RCA ω 0 and RCA 0 prove the same sentences 'up to language' as the latter is set-based and the former function-based.
Furthermore, recursion as in (2.3) is called primitive recursion; the class of functionals obtained from R ρ for all ρ ∈ T is called Gödel's system T of all (higherorder) primitive recursive functionals.
We use the usual notations for natural, rational, and real numbers, and the associated functions, as introduced in [36, p. 288-289] . (1) Natural numbers correspond to type zero objects, and we use 'n 0 ' and 'n ∈ N' interchangeably. Rational numbers are defined as signed quotients of natural numbers, and 'q ∈ Q' and '< Q ' have their usual meaning. (2) Real numbers are coded by fast-converging Cauchy sequences q (·) : N → Q, i.e. such that (∀n [36, p. 289 ] to guarantee that every f 1 defines a real number. (3) We write 'x ∈ R' to express that We sometimes omit the subscript 'R' if it is clear from context. We also introduce some notation to handle finite sequences nicely. Notation 2.6 (Finite sequences). We assume a dedicated type for 'finite sequences of objects of type ρ', namely ρ * . Since the usual coding of pairs of numbers goes through in RCA ω 0 , we shall not always distinguish between 0 and 0 * . Similarly, we do not always distinguish between 's ρ ' and ' s ρ ', where the former is 'the object s of type ρ', and the latter is 'the sequence of type ρ * with only element s ρ '. The empty sequence for the type ρ * is denoted by ' ρ ', usually with the typing omitted.
Furthermore, we denote by '|s| = n' the length of the finite sequence s
, where | | = 0, i.e. the empty sequence has length zero. For sequences s ρ * , t ρ * , we denote by 's * t' the concatenation of s and t, i.e. (s * t)(i) = s(i) for i < |s| and (s * t)(j) = t(|s|−j) for |s| ≤ j < |s|+|t|. For a sequence s ρ * , we define sN := s(0), s (1), . . . , s(N − 1) for N 0 < |s|. For a sequence α 0→ρ , we also write
, which is (equivalent to) quantifier-free if A is.
2.4.
Higher-order computability theory. As noted above, our main results will be proved using techniques from computability theory. Thus, we first make our notion of 'computability' precise as follows.
(I) We adopt ZFC, i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice, as the official metatheory for all results, unless explicitly stated otherwise. (II) We adopt Kleene's notion of higher-order computation as given by his nine clauses S1-S9 (See [38, 58] ) as our official notion of 'computable'. For the rest of this section, we introduce some existing functionals which will be used below. These functionals constitute the counterparts of Z 2 , and some of the Big Five systems, in higher-order RM. First of all, ACA 0 is readily derived from:
and
, and is clearly discontinuous at f = 1 11 . . . ; in fact, (µ 2 ) is equivalent to the existence of F : R → R such that F (x) = 1 if x > R 0, and 0 otherwise ( [36, §3] ). Secondly, Π 1 1 -CA 0 is readily derived from the following sentence:
(
and Π Thirdly, full second-order arithmetic Z 2 is readily derived from the sentence:
and we define Z Fourth, there is primitive recursive function U such that 'U (e, k, n) = 0 m + 1' expresses that the e-th Turing machine with input k halts after n steps with output m. By definition, Feferman's µ 2 provides an upper bound on this n if it exists, i.e. we can use µ 2 to solve the Halting problem. Similarly, Gandy's superjump solves the Halting problem for higher-order computability as follows:
where e is an S1-S9-index. A characterisation of S in terms of discontinuities may be found in [27] . Clearly, the above functionals are natural counterparts of (set-based) comprehension axioms in a functional-based language.
Fifth, recall that the Cousin lemma from Remark 1.1 states the existence of a finite sub-cover for an open cover of the unit interval. Since Cantor space is homeomorphic to a closed subset of [0, 1], the former inherits the same property. In particular, for any G 2 , the corresponding 'canonical cover' of 2
is the set of all binary extensions of σ. By compactness, there is a finite sequence f 0 , . . . , f n such that the set of
N . We now introduce the specification SCF(Θ) for a (non-unique) functional Θ which computes such a finite sequence. We refer to such a functional Θ as a realiser for the compactness of Cantor space, and simplify its type to '3' to improve readability. Definition 2.7. The formula SCF(Θ) is as follows for Θ
where 'f ∈ [gG(g)]' is the quantifier-free formula f G(g) = 0 * gG(g).
Clearly, there is no unique Θ as in (2.4) (just add more binary sequences to Θ(G)); nonetheless, we have in the past referred to any Θ satisfying SCF(Θ) as 'the' special fan functional Θ, and we will continue this abuse of language. We shall however repeatedly point out the non-unique nature of the special fan functional Θ in the following. While Θ may appear exotic at first, it provides the only method we can think of for computing gauge integrals in general, as discussed in Remark 3.27. As to its provenance, Θ was introduced as part of the study of the Gandy-Hyland functional in [60, §2] via a slightly different definition. These definitions are identical up to a term of Gödel's T of low complexity.
Finally, we should discuss why the above systems involving the 'ω' superscripts are the 'right' (or at least 'good') higher-order analogues of the correspoding secondorder systems. We also discuss the special case of Z [36] as the base theory for higher-order RM and proves that it is conservative over RCA 0 up to language. Hence, it makes sense to similarly use the superscript 'ω' to denote the higher-order counterparts of subsystems of second-order arithmetic Z 2 Secondly, most of the aforementioned systems with superscript 'ω' are known conservative extensions (for at least Π is placed between the medium and strong range. The motivation is that the combination of the recursor R 2 from Gödel's T and ∃ 3 yields a system stronger than Z Ω 2 . On the other hand, the system Z ω 2 does not suffer from this problem, and we therefore believe that the latter is the 'right' higher-order analogue of second-order arithmetic Z 2 .
Main results I
We establish our main results as sketched in Section 1.3. We treat the Cousin lemma in full detail in Section 3.1, while similar 'covering theorems' from Remark 1.1 are treated analogously in Section 3.2. We show in Section 3.3 that the Cousin lemma is equivalent to various basic properties of the gauge integral. 
Note that HBU makes use of the original formulation by Cousin as in (1.1). We show in [61, §3.4 ] that HBU sports a certain robustness, in that its logical properties do not depend on the exact choice of definition of cover. The main goal of this section is to prove the following theorem, which establishes that full second-order arithmetic is needed to prove the Cousin lemma as in HBU. in that restricting the variable x to the (Turing) computable reals or the rationals in I does not make a difference. We now prove the first part of Theorem 3.1. Proof. We only sketch the proof as it makes use of items from Remark 1.1 to be studied in Section 3.2. A full proof may be found in Theorem 3.14. Now, to derive HBU, we note that the Lindelöf lemma provides a countable sub-cover for any open cover of I. Since (∃ 3 ) immediately implies Z 2 , we may use [68, IV.1.2], which implies that every countable open cover has a finite sub-cover. What remains is to prove the Lindelöf lemma, which readily follows from the Neighbourhood function principle NFP, i.e. item (v) in Remark 1.1, as will become clear in the proof of Theorem 3.14. In turn, NFP has a straightforward proof in Z Ω 2 + QF-AC 0,1 , as will also become clear in the proof of Theorem 3.14.
As noted above, we shall make use of computability theory to establish Theorem 3.1. Hence, we first show that HBU is equivalent to the existence of the special fan functional Θ in Theorem 3.3. Theorem 3.1 will then be established by showing that models of Π 
Proof. We first point out two useful properties of Feferman's µ: the axiom (µ 2 ) defining the latter functional is equivalent to the existence of F : R → R such that F (x) = 1 if x > R 0, and 0 otherwise ( [36, §3] ). Furthermore, by repeatedly applying µ, we can show that any arithmetical formula is equivalent to a quantifier-free one. We also recall the notation 'f ∈ [σ]' for covers of Cantor space from Definition 2.7.
Based on the previous, given Ψ, y 1 , . . . , y k as in HBU, we can decide if the intervals I Ψ yi form an open covering or not: we just check (using µ) how the end-points of these intervals are interleaved. Thus, using µ as a parameter, we can deduce (3.1) from HBU by QF-AC 2,1 . Likewise, given f 1 , . . . , f n ≤ 1 1 and k 1 , . . . , k n in N, we can decide if the set of neighbourhoods [f i k i ] form a covering or not; hence, we may use QF-AC 2,1 to similarly obtain Θ from the compactness of Cantor space.
N ; note that ξ is a continuous projection of {0, 1} N to [0, 1], while ζ is the homeomorphism between {0, 1} N and the classical Cantor space C c . Using ξ and ζ, we can convert canonical covers between I and Cantor space as follows:
N → N, we define Ψ F (x) as the distance from x to C c if x ∈ C c , and as the least rational (in some canonical enumeration of
These constructions are arithmetical, and the compactness property for the associated coverings are transferred from one space to the other in both directions.
From the proof, we may also conclude that there is a term t such that if SCF(Θ) and Ω := t(Θ, µ) then Ω satisfies (3.1), and conversely, there is a term s such that if Ω satisfies (3.1) and Θ := s(Ω, µ), then SCF(Θ). The proof makes use of the Axiom of Choice (as in QF-AC) to obtain a functional Θ as in SCF(Θ), resp. Ω satisfying (3.1), from the existence of finite sub-coverings. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of known proofs of HBU yields such functionals Θ and Ω without the Axiom of Choice. We discuss this in more detail in Remark 3.9 below. Finally, we point out that ACA ω 0 + QF-AC is also Π Proof. We introduce a family of type structures validating (∀Θ 3 )¬SCF(Θ). Theorem 3.8 below tells us that one of those structures contains all S 1 k and is closed under S1-S9, establishing the theorem. Intuitively speaking, we start from a β-model A and have that any functional G : A → N which is computable in some S 2 k and elements from A will be total over N N by the same algorithm. By absoluteness, there are f 1 , . . . , f n in A inducing a covering of 2 N of the standard form. Since it is flexible which objects of type 2 we include in an extension of A to a typed structure, A together with the S 2 k 's cannot "decide" whether there is Θ as in SCF(Θ)
• There is an element in A k enumerating A k−1 .
• A k is the closure of a finite set g 1 , . . . , g n k under computability in S 2 k . For the sake of uniform terminology, we rename ∃ 2 to S 2 0 and let the associated finite sequence g 1 , . . . , g n0 be the empty list.
We now define the functional F 2 on A as follows.
. where e is a 'minimal' index for computing f from S 2 k and {g 1 , . . . , g n k } as follows: the ordinal rank of this computation of f is minimal and e is minimal among the indices for f of the same ordinal rank.
By definition, F as in Definition 3.6 is injective on A 0 and on each set A k+1 \ A k . Moreover, if m is the usual measure on 2 N , we see that
As a consequence, if F is extended to a total functional G and Θ satisfies SCF(Θ), then Θ(G) cannot be a finite list from A. Similarly, a finite sequence f 1 , . . . , f n in A is already in some ∪ k≤m A k , and (3.2) implies that
does not cover Cantor space, for any total extension G of F . Thus, for any type structure Tp = {Tp n } n∈N where Tp 0 = N, Tp 1 = A and F ∈ Tp 2 , there is no instance of Θ as in SCF(Θ) in Tp 3 . To establish the theorem, we require one such type structure, containing each S 2 k and F , and closed under Kleene's S1-S9; such a type structure is provided by Theorem 3.8, i.e. the latter establishes the theorem, and we are done.
For Theorem 3.8, we require some properties of F 2 from Definition 3.6.
Lemma 3.7 (Properties of the functional F ).
(1) For each k, the restriction of F to A k is computable in the functions g 1 , . . . , g n k from Convention 3.5, and the functional S 
finite sub-covering in the type structure.
Proof. The theorem expresses exactly what Tp n has to be for n = 0 and n = 1. For n > 1, we recursively let Tp n consist of all functionals φ : Tp n−1 → N that are S1-S9-computable in F , some S 2 k , and elements from A, where F is as in Definition 3.6. This type structure has the desired property. Note that Feferman's µ is S1-S9-computable from ∃ 2 , and the former immediately yields QF-AC 1,0 .
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is now done. As to the role of QF-AC 0,1 , we show in [51, §4] that HBU is provable in Z is not essential for obtaining HBU. We finish this section with a remark. 8 Lindelöf formulates his lemma in [37, p. 698] as follows: Soit (P) un ensemble quelconque situé dans l'espace R n et, de chaque point P comme centre, construisons une sphère S P d'un rayon ρ P qui peut varier de l'un pointà l'autre; il existe une infinité dénombrable de ces sphères de telle sorte que tout point de l'ensemble donné soit intérieurà au moins l'une d'elles. Applying QF-AC 0,1 to LIND, one could obtain Φ 0→1 such that (∀n ∈ N)[(an, bn) = I Ψ
Φ(n)
], but such a functional is nowhere to be found in Lindelöf's original formulation.
Definition 3.10.
[LIND] For every Ψ : R → R + , there is a sequence of open intervals ∪ n∈N (a n , b n ) covering R such that (∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ R)[(a n , b n ) = I
Definition 3.12.
[LIND 3 ] (∃Ξ)(∀Ψ : R → R + )(∀x ∈ R)(∃n 0 )(x ∈ I Ψ Ξ(Ψ)(n) ). The following theorem establishes the connection between LIND and HBU, while also showing that the introduction of Ξ or Φ does not change LIND much. 
Proof. For the first part, WKL 0 implies that every countable cover of I has a finite sub-cover by [68, IV. For the second part, we only need to prove the forward implications. So assume LIND and note that the formula '(a n , b n ) = I Ψ x ' is just a n = R x − Ψ(x) ∧ b n = R x + Ψ(x), which is Π 0 1 , i.e. this formula is decidable using µ 2 , and we can treat it as quantifier-free in ACA ω 0 . Now apply QF-AC 0,1 to (∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ R)[(a n , b n ) = I 
Here, 'γ 1 ∈ K 0 ' expresses that γ 1 is an associate, which is the same as a code from RM by [35, Prop. 4.4] . Formally, 'γ 1 ∈ K 0 ' is the following formula:
The value γ(f ) for γ ∈ K 0 is defined as the unique γ(f n) − 1 for n large enough. Now, since A as in NFP is a Π 1 k -formula for some k, we may treat it as quantifierfree given (∃ 3 ). Applying QF-AC 1,0 to the antecedent of NFP, there is Y 2 such that (∀f 1 )A(f Y (f )). Define Z 2 using (∃ 3 ) as follows: Z(f ) is the least n ≤ Y (f ) such that A(f n) if it exists, and zero otherwise. Note that Z is continuous on N N and hence has an associate by [35, Prop. 4.7] . Alternatively, define the associate γ 1 directly as follows: for w 0 * , define γ(w) as the least n ≤ |w| such that A(wn) if such there is, and zero otherwise. Clearly, we have γ ∈ K 0 and (∀f 1 )A(f γ(f )), i.e. NFP follows. Finally, LIND follows from the latter by considering:
for Ψ : R → R + , and where the formula in square brackets is abbreviated A(xn). This is a slight abuse of notation, as (only) the first 2 n elements in the sequence x 1 are being used in (3.3). Applying NFP to (3.3), we obtain γ ∈ K 0 such that:
Note that the formula in square brackets in (3.4) is arithmetical (including the formula needed to make the notation γ(x) work). Hence, using QF-AC 0,1 and (µ 2 ), there is a functional Φ which provides the real y from (3.4) on input x ∈ Q. The countable sub-cover of ∪ x∈R I Ψ x can then be found by enumerating Φ(q w ) for all finite sequences w 0 * of rationals which represent rationals q 0 w and are such that γ(w) > 0 0. In particular, every x ∈ R is in some I Ψ y by (3.4), and since v
γ(x) is in the aforementioned enumeration, we also have x ∈ I Ψ Φ(qv ) .
By the first part of Theorem 3.13, the results regarding LIND have to be somewhat similar to those for HBU. However, the Lindelöf theorem for the Baire space behaves quite differently, as will be established in Section 4.2. Furthermore, while HBU implies WKL, LIND does not by the following corollary. ECF ' is a syntactic translation which -intuitively-replaces any object of type 2 or higher by a code γ 1 ∈ K 0 . Thus, to establish the corollary, it suffices to show that [LIND] ECF is provable in RCA 0 . However, LIND only involves objects of type 0 and 1, except for the leading quantifier. Hence, [LIND] ECF is nothing more than LIND with '(∀Ψ 1→1 )' replaced by '(∀γ 1 ∈ K 0 )'. Thus, by enumerating γ(w) as in the proof of the theorem, we immediately obtain a countable sub-cover, and [LIND] ECF is provable in RCA 0 .
Finally, we discuss the Lindelöf lemma in the grand scheme of things, and associated results to be proved in [51] .
Remark 3.16. The following are equivalent over ZF by [28] : (i) R is a Lindelöf space, and (ii) the axiom of countable choice (for subsets of R). This resonates with the use of QF-AC 0,1 in Theorem 3.14, but is not the entire story: we introduce a weak and a strong version of LIND (and HBU) in [51] based on the 1895 and 1899 proofs of the Heine-Borel theorem by Borel ([8] ) and Schoenflies ([63] ). The weak version of LIND (and HBU) is provable in Z Ω 2 (and hence in ZF). This is possible as the weak version only provides the existence of a countable sub-cover as in LIND, while the strong version additionally identifies a sequence of reals which yield the countable sub-cover, as in LIND 2 via Φ 0→1 .
Other theorems.
We discuss how the theorems in Remark 1.1 imply either LIND or HBU, and hence have similar properties to the latter.
(1) The Besicovitsch and Vitali 9 covering lemmas as in [ Remark 3.17. The Cousin lemma is special because it deals with bounded sets (essentially the unit interval), while the other covering theorems apply to unbounded sets (e.g. R n ). Now, a cover of the latter is generally difficult to handle, but any countable sub-cover 'automatically' has nice properties: e.g. the countable subadditivity of the Lebesgue measure. In fact, the proofs of Sard's theorem and the maximal theorem in [1] , and of the Lebesgue density theorem in [66] are based on this idea. In other words, the non-local character of some of the covering theorems in Remark 1.1 is important for some real applications of these theorems.
Similarly, for properties which hold in the unit interval minus a measure zero set, like the differentiation theorem for gauge integrals ([6, p. 80]), one uses the Vitali covering theorem to provide a countable sub-cover in which the complement of a finite sub-sub-cover has small length. Hence, one can neglect this complement and the finite nature of the sub-sub-cover then makes the proof straightforward.
3.3. The gauge integral. In this section, we provide a brief introduction to the gauge integral (Section 3.3.1) and establish that basic properties of this integral, like uniqueness and the fact it extends the Riemann and Lebesgue integral, are equivalent to HBU (Section 3.3.2) over the (relatively weak) system ACA ω 0 . As will become clear below, the gauge integral enjoys both greater conceptual simplicity and higher generality than the Lebesgue integral. For this reason, there have been calls for (a somewhat stripped-down version of) the gauge integral to replace the Riemann and Lebesgue integral (and the associated measure theory) in the undergraduate curriculum ( [3] [4] [5] ). In a nutshell, the gauge integral can only be called natural and mainstream from the point of view of mathematics.
Regarding the connection between physics and the gauge integral, Muldowney has expressed the following opinion in a private communication. A limitation of the 'ε-δ-definition' of the Riemann integral is that near a singularity of a function f : [0, 1] → R, changes smaller than any fixed δ > 0 in x can still result in huge changes in f (x), guaranteeing that the associated Riemann sums vary (much) more than the given ε > 0. The gauge integral solves this problem by replacing the fixed δ > 0 with a gauge function δ : R → R + ; the latter can single out those partitions with 'many' partition points near singularities to compensate for the extreme behaviour there. Similarly, δ : R → R + can single out partitions which avoid 'small' sets whose contribution to the Riemann sums should be negligible. We study (2) A sequence P := (t 0 , I 0 , . . . , t k , I k ) is a tagged partition of I, written 'P ∈ tp', if the 'tag' t i ∈ R is in the interval I i for i ≤ k, and the I i partition I. (3) If δ is a gauge on I and P = (t i , I i ) i≤k is a tagged partition of I, then P is δ-fine if
For a tagged partition P = (t i , I i ) i≤k of I and any f , the Riemann sum
A gauge modulus for f is a function Φ : R → (R → R + ) such that Φ(ε) is a gauge as in the previous item for all ε > R 0.
The real A from items (5) and (6) in Definition 3.18 is resp. called the Riemann and gauge integral. We will always interpret b a f as a gauge integral, unless explicitly stated otherwise. We abbreviate 'Riemann integration' to 'R-integration', and the same for related notions. The following examples are well-known. f = R 2 using the gauge modulus δ ε (x) := εx 2 for x > 0 and ε 2 otherwise. Let g be constant 1 for x ∈ Q, and zero otherwise. It is easy to show 1 0 g = R 0 using the gauge modulus δ ε (x) := 1 if x ∈ Q and ε/2 k+1 if x equals the k-th rational (for some enumeration of the rationals fixed in advance).
Finally, using the Axiom of Choice, a gauge integrable function always has a gauge modulus, but this is not the case in weak systems like RCA 
3.3.2.
Reverse Mathematics of the gauge integral. We show that basic properties of the gauge integral are equivalent to HBU. We have based this development on Bartle's introductory monograph [6] .
First of all, we show that HBU is equivalent to the uniqueness of the gauge integral, and to the fact that the latter extends the R-integral. Note that the names of the two items in the theorem are from [6, p. 13-14] . Proof. We prove HBU → (i) → (ii) → HBU, where only the first implication requires (µ 2 ). To prove that HBU implies Uniqueness, we assume the former and first prove that for every δ : R → R + there exists a δ-fine tagged partition. To this end, apply HBU to ∪ x∈I (x − δ(x), x + δ(x)) to obtain a finite sub-cover w := (y 0 , . . . , y k ), i.e. we have I ⊂ ∪ x∈w (x − δ(x), x + δ(x)). The latter cover is readily converted into a tagged partition P 0 := (z j , I j ) j≤l (with l ≤ k and z j ∈ w for j ≤ l) by removing overlapping segments and omitting redundant intervals 'from left to right'. By definition, z j ∈ I j ⊂ (z j − δ(z j ), z j + δ(z j )) for j ≤ l, i.e. P 0 is δ-fine. Now let f be gauge integrable on I and suppose we have for i = 1, 2 (A i ∈ R) that:
Fix ε > 0 and δ i : R → R + in (3.5) for i = 1, 2. We define δ 3 : R → R + as δ 3 (x) := min(δ 1 (x), δ 2 (x)). By definition, a partition which is δ 3 -fine, is also δ ifinite for i = 1, 2. Now let the partition P 0 ∈ tp be δ 3 -fine, and derive the following:
Hence, we must have A 1 = R A 2 , and Uniqueness follows.
To prove that Uniqueness implies Consistency, note that 'P is d δ -fine' is equivalent to ' P ≤ δ' for the gauge d δ : R → R + which is constant δ > 0. Rewriting the definition of Riemann integration with this equivalence, we observe that an R-integrable function f is also gauge integrable (with a constant gauge d δ for every choice of ε > 0). The assumption Uniqueness then guarantees that the number A is the only possible gauge integral for f on I, i.e. the two integrals are equal.
To prove that Consistency implies HBU, suppose the latter is false, i.e. there is Ψ 0 : R → R + such that ∪ x∈I I
Ψ0
x does not have a finite sub-cover. Now let f : I → R be R-integrable with R-integral A ∈ R. Define the gauge δ 0 as δ 0 (x) := Ψ 0 (x) and note that for any P ∈ tp, we have that P is not δ 0 -fine, as ∪ x∈I I Ψ0 x would otherwise have a finite sub-cover (provided by the tags of P ). Hence, the following statement is vacuously true, as the underlined part is false:
However, (3.6) implies that f is gauge integrable with gauge δ 0 and gauge integral A + 1, i.e. Consistency is false as the Riemann and gauge integrals of f differ. Note that δ 0 also provides a gauge modulus by (3.6) in case ¬HBU.
By the above, the role of HBU in making the gauge integral well-behaved, consists in avoiding (3.5) and (3.6) being vacuously true due to the absence of δ i -fine partitions (for i = 0, 1, 2) . Thus, the Cousin lemma is called Fineness theorem in [6] . As will become clear below, this is the sole role of HBU in this context. Nonetheless, HBU features in the RM of topology and uniform theorems in [51, 61] , and Remark 3.27 suggest an important role for the special fan functional, a realiser for HBU in gauge integration.
In passing, we discuss the question if ACA ω 0 in the previous (and subsequent) theorem can be weakened to RCA ω 0 . In our opinion, this weakening would not be spectacular, given that HBU requires Z 
The function δ 3 is discontinuous in general, but can be defined in ACA ω 0 . Secondly, we prove the Cauchy criterion for gauge integrals, as this theorem is needed below. Our proof is based on [6, p. 40] and illuminates the role of Θ. 
Proof. The forward implication follows by considering a gauge modulus Φ for f and
where P, Q are Φ(ε/2)-fine and A is the gauge integral of f over I. For the reverse implication let Φ be as in (3.8); we need to find the real A from the definition of gauge integration. This real A can be obtained as the limit of the sequence S(f, Q n ) where Q n is a Φ( 1 2 n )-fine partition. Now, these partitions Q n can in turn be defined by applying the functional Ω from Theorem 3.3 to the canonical cover associated to Φ( 1 2 n ) and using Feferman's µ to convert the resulting finite sub-cover to a suitable partition. Finally, (3.8) guarantees that the sequence S(f, Q n ) is Cauchy, while ACA 0 proves that a Cauchy sequence has a limit by [68, III.2.2].
The previous proof explains the need for a gauge modulus: the latter is essential in 'reconstructing' the gauge integral A as the limit in the proof, if A is not given.
Thirdly, we show that HBU is equivalent to the fact that the gauge integral encompasses the improper R-integral. The latter is a (usual) R-integral
where additionally a limit operation like lim a→0 or lim b→∞ is applied. This method allows one to consider unbounded domains or use singularities as end points; as suggested by its name, an improper R-integral is (generally) not an actual Rintegral. Now, Hake's theorem ( [6, p. 195] ) implies that improper R-integrals are automatically gauge integrals. We consider special cases of Hake's theorem, including item (iii) below which does mention gauge integrability but does not mention gauge integrals or their uniqueness. As a result, it is fair to say that the following equivalences are not (only) based on the uniqueness of the gauge integral. g exists for x > 0 and is readily seen to equal ln(x), the natural logarithm. However, the limit x → 0+ of this function is −∞. Thus, the limit lim x→0+ 1 x g does not exist, and by the contraposition of weak Hake's theorem, we conclude that g is not gauge integrable with a modulus on I, i.e. item (i) follows.
The implication (i) → HBU follows from the proof of Theorem 3.20: in the last part of the latter proof, it is shown that ¬HBU allows us to define a gauge δ 0 for which there are no δ 0 -fine partitions. Hence, the underlined part in (3.6) is false, making the formula trivially true for any f and A, i.e. every function is gauge integrable (with a modulus). Contraposition now yields the desired implication.
Finally, we prove item (ii) in ACA ω 0 + HBU based on the proof in [6, p. 195 ]. In a nutshell, the latter uses the Saks-Henstock lemma to prove that the indefinite integral F (x) := 1 x f is (ε-δ-)continuous in x on I. Hence lim x→0+ F (x) = R F (0), which is exactly as required for item (ii). First of all, the Saks-Henstock lemma intuitively states that if one considers a sub-partition of a δ-fine partition, one inherets all the 'nice' properties of the original partition. The proof of this lemma is a straight-forward 'epsilon-delta' argument, with one subtlety: the Cauchy criterion (as is Theorem 3.22) for gauge integrals requires a gauge modulus, which we (therefore) assumed in item (ii). The proof that the Saks-Henstock lemma yields the continuity of F (x) := 1 x f is also a straight-forward 'epsilon-delta' argument.
The gauge integral is a proper extension of the Lebesgue and (improper) Riemann integral. As it turns out, this claim is of considerable logical strength, as follows. 
, and 0 otherwise. Then for x > R 0, the area between the horizontal axis and the graph of |κ| on [0, x] is just a finite collection of (bounded) rectangles, i.e. |κ| is definitely R-integrable on [0, x] for x < 1. In particular, if x ≥ R 1 − 1 2 k , there are at least k rectangles to the left of x; the first has base 1/2 and area 1, the second one base 1/4 and area 1/2, . . . , the k-th one has base 1/2 k and area 1/k. The R-integral x 0 |κ| is thus at least
The limit of the latter is the divergent harmonic series, and item (iii) from Theorem 3.23 yields that |κ| is not gauge integrable on I with a modulus. To prove that κ is gauge integrable on I, note that (3.7) allows us to 'piece together' gauges. The following gauge modulus is based on that idea:
where E is the set consisting of the real 1 and all a k , and where m(ε) is such that m(ε) ≥ 1 ε and the tail of the alternating harmonic series satisfies |
We leave it as an exercise that this gauge can be defined in ACA ω 0 . The proof that δ ε is a gauge for κ is completely straightforward and elementary, but somewhat long and tedious. Hence, we omit this proof and refer to [6, p. 35] .
Example 3.21 notwithstanding, we now prove that the base theory in Theorem 3.20 can be weakened to weak König's lemma. [35, Prop. 4.10] . Hence, the definition of gauge integral reduces to that of Riemann integral, and the latter is even unique in RCA 0 . The law of excluded middle as in (µ 2 ) ∨ ¬(µ 2 ) now finishes the proof.
Fifth, we discuss in what sense we may evaluate (general) gauge integrals.
Remark 3.27 (Computing integrals). In the case of the R-integral, a modulus (of R-integration) computes a δ > 0 in terms of any ε > 0 as in Definition 3.18. Hence, if P n is the equidistant partition of I with mesh 1/2 n , we know that S(P n , f ) converges to the R-integral of f on I, and the modulus provides a rate of convergence. For the gauge integral, there is no analogue of the equidistant partition: even given a gauge modulus δ(ε, x), we need to find, say for every ε > 0, a δ(ε, ·)-fine partition Q ε ; only then can we consider the limit of S(Q ε , f ) for ε → 0, which converges to the gauge integral of f on I as in Theorem 3.22. To find such a partition, the only option (we can imagine) is to consider ∪ x∈I (x − δ(ε, x), x + δ(ε, x)) and apply the realiser Ω for HBU as in (3.1) to obtain a finite sub-cover. The latter can be modified using µ 2 into a δ(ε, ·)-fine partition.
Finally, we discuss some foundational implications of the above results.
Remark 3.28. Feferman discusses in [19, V] what fragments of mathematics are necessary for the development of physics. He claims that the logical system W, a conservative extension of Peano arithmetic, suffices for this purpose. Feferman also discusses two purported (exotic) counterexamples involving non-measurable sets and non-separable spaces; he shows that these are rather fringe in physics, if part of the latter at all. However, by contrast, Feynman's path integral and the associated diagrammatic approach are central to large parts of modern physics. To the best of our knowledge, the gauge integral is unique in that it provides a formalisation (of part) of Feynman's formalism that remains close to Feyman's development and ideas (based on Riemann sums), as discussed in [43, §A.2] and [12, Ch. 10] . Hence, if one requires that a mathematical formalisation remains close to the original treatment in physics, then there seems to be no choice other than the gauge integral for the formalisation of Feynman's path integral. As established in this section, the basic development of the gauge integral requires HBU, and the latter is not provable in any Π 1 k -CA ω 0 , a system much stronger than W. Thus, Feferman's above claim seems incorrect, assuming the aforementioned caveat concerning formalisations.
Main results II
We obtain some surprising results in higher-order RM related to the Cousin and Lindelöf lemmas. In particular, we study the behaviour of the latter in combination with Feferman's µ and the Suslin functional S.
4.1.
Jumping to transfinite recursion. In [49] , we established that ACA ω 0 + QF-AC + HBU proves arithmetical transfinite recursion as in ATR 0 , i.e. HBU suffices to jump from the third to the fourth Big Five system. Moreover, we proved that there exists, without constructing it, a term of Gödel's T which computes a realiser for ATR 0 from Θ and µ. Furthermore, in [50] we provide a direct construction of this fact, with a proof that Θ restricted to arithmetical functions suffices. One consequence is that HBU cannot be satisfied within the class of Borel functions. Now, n∈N [0, 1] n is a Polish space, and the following theorem makes perfect sense. As a consequence, the combination of Feferman's µ and any such Ξ computes the superjump S. We recall the fact that the special fan functional Θ is not unique, and neither is 'the' aforementioned functional Ξ.
4.2.1.
Computing the superjump. We show that the combination of the Suslin functional S and the special fan functional Θ computes the superjump. The latter corresponds to the Halting problem for computability on type two inputs. Indeed, the superjump S 3 was introduced in [24] by Gandy (essentially) as follows:
where the formula '{e}(F ) terminates' is a Π 1 1 -formula defined by Kleene's S1-S9. As to its history, Harrington has proved that the first ordinal not computable in S is the first recursively Mahlo ordinal ( [26] ). In turn, the latter ordinal appears in the study of constructive set and type theory and the associated proof theory ( [54] [55] [56] ). In particular, {R ⊆ N : R is computable from S} is the smallest β-model of ∆ Proof. We first provide a sketch of the proof as follows. Recall that if σ is a finite binary sequence, then [σ] is the set of total binary extensions of σ.
(1) Given F 2 , let α F (e) = {e}(F, e) whenever the value is in {0, 1}, and let X F be the set of total binary extensions of α F . (2) Compute G F from F and S with the properties
Show that S(F ) is uniformly computable in S and f ∈ X F . (4) Since Θ(G F ) has to intersect X F , and we can decide where, S(F ) is computable in Θ and S, uniformly in F .
We work out the proof in full detail below.
We will now list some basic lemmas needed for the detailed proof of Theorem 4.2. We first define an important concept relating to S1-S9 computability with type two inputs. Its importance stems from the fact that it is independent of the choice of input functional F 2 , as follows.
There is a primitive recursive ξ of type level 1, independent of the choice of F 2 , such that {ξ(e, a)}(F, ξ(e, a)) is resp. (0, 1, undefined) whenever {e}(F, a) is resp. (= 0, > 0, undefined). where '≃' means that both sides are undefined or both sides are defined and equal.
Definition 4.5. Let f be a total binary function. By an application of the recursion theorem for Turing computations in oracles we define
Clearly, if the recursion goes on forever, [e] f ( a) will be undefined.
Intuitively speaking and from the outside, [·] f may look like an indexing of some partial functions computable in some functional of type 2, but to what extent this is correct, will depend on the choice of f .
We will now use F to define a relation, mimicking the subcomputation relation relative to F , as far as possible. As a cheap trick, we will let an alleged computation tuple be a subcomputation of its own if it is clear that something is wrong, in order to force such objects into the non-well-founded part of the relation. Definition 4.6. Given f , we let Ω f be the set of triples (e, a, b) such that [e] f ( a) = b. Given F as well, define the relation '≺' (short for ≺ f,F ) on Ω f as follows:
• If e is not a Kleene index for any of S1-S9, we put (e, a, b) ≺ (e, a, b).
• If e is an index for an initial computation, we let (e, a, b) be a leaf in our ordering if {e}(F, a) = b, and its own sub-node otherwise. This decision will be independent of the choice of the functional F . The intuitive explanation of Definition 4.6 is as follows: The set of finite sequences (e, a, b) such that {e}(F, a) = b is defined by a strictly positive inductive definition, so whenever a sequence is added to the set it is either initial or there is a unique set of other sequences in the set causing that we accept the one chosen. These are called immediate predecessors in the computation tree. The relation '≺' is defined on the set of (e, a, b) where [e] f ( a) = b as the immediate predecessor relation wherever the inductive definition of the computation tree is locally correct.
Lemma 4.7. For any function f , the well-founded segment of Ω f , ≺ f,F is an initial segment of the full computation relation of F .
Proof. This is trivial by induction over this well-founded segment. Lemma 4.9. If f ∈ X F and {e} (F, a) = b, then (e, a, b) is in the ≺ f,F -well-founded part of Ω f . Moreover, this well-founded part is exactly the full tree of terminating computations {e}(F, a) = b relative to F .
Proof. That the computation tree for computations relative to F is contained in the well-founded part is proved by induction over the tree of real computations. Now, if the well-founded part of Ω f , ≺ f,F contains more, we may consider one alleged computation (e, a, b) in Ω f that is not a real F -computation, but that is minimal as such. Since it is in the well-founded part, (e, a, b) is locally correct, so either it is an initial computation or it has subcomputations that are real (because we consider a minimal one). Being locally correct, we see in each case that (e, a, b) must be genuine after all.
Lemma 4.10. If f ∈ X F , then S(F ) is uniformly computable in f , F and S.
Proof. From the data, we can compute the characteristic function of {(e, a, b) | {e}( a) = b}, and S(F ) is primitive recursive in this characteristic function.
We are now ready to provide the proof of Theorem 4.2 as follows.
Proof. We see from Lemma 4.7 that if the ≺ f,F -well-founded part of Ω f is closed under the Kleene schemes S1-S9 relative to F , then S(F ) is computable in f , F and S as above. We need S to isolate the well-founded part, and (only) F and µ 2 to decide if we have the closure. Now, assume that f is such that the ≺ f,F -well-founded part is not S1-S9-closed. Let {e}(F, a) = b be a computation of minimal rank such that we do not have [e] f ( a) = b. By induction on b we see that there must be an index d such that {d}(F, d) ∈ {0, 1} and {d}(F, d) = f (d). If we then put G F (f ) := d + 1 we have ensured that there will be no extension of f G F (f ) in X F . Using Gandy selection for F, µ and f , we can trivially find a d with this property from the well-founded part of Ω f . In order to show that G F is definable from S, F, µ via a term in Gödel's T , we proceed as follows:
Given the well-founded part W of Ω F , we may arithmetically decide if it respects S1-S9. If it does not, let Γ be the, arithmetically in F , inductive definition of the computation tuples for computing relative to F , and by one application of µ on Γ(W ) \ W , we may find the (e, a, b) that leads us to the d we need.
In light of the previous, we put G F (f ) := 0 if the ≺ f,F -well-founded part of Ω f is a fixed point of the inductive definition of computations relative to F , while we put G F (f ) := d + 1 for the d selected as above otherwise. Thus, Θ(G F ) must contain a function from which, together with F and S, we can compute S(F ).
Some of the methods in this proof have been expanded in [48, 51] , where even sharper results have been obtained. Similar to the specification SCF(Θ) for the special fan functional Θ, we introduce the following specification based on LIND 4 . As for the former specification, the functional Ξ 2→(0→1) satisfying LIN(Ξ) is not unique.
(∀Ψ 2 )(∀g 1 )(∃n 0 )(g ∈ Ξ(Ψ)(n)Ψ(Ξ(Ψ)(n)) ).
(LIN(Ξ))
As for the special fan functional Θ in Theorem 3.3, the existence of Ξ as in LIN(Ξ) amounts to the Lindelöf lemma LIND 4 itself. Proof. We only need to prove the forward direction. We rephrase LIND 4 to (∀G 2 )(∃f
where f + (k) = f (k + 1). Using the Suslin functional S and µ we see that the part of (4.1) inside the (outermost) square brackets can be viewed as quantifier-free, and thus the existence of Ξ follows from QF-AC 2,1 . (∃ξ 1 ∈ K 0 )(∀γ 1 ∈ K 0 )(∀g 1 )(∃n 0 )(g ∈ ξ(γ)(n)γ(ξ(γ)(n)) ).
Thus, by defining ξ as the enumeration of γ(w) as in the proof of Theorem 3.14, we obtain an associate for a functional producing a countable sub-cover, and the sentence [(∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ)] ECF is therefore provable in RCA 0 . Proof. Recall the definition of the Suslin functional S as follows:
S(f ) = 0 if (∃g 1 )(∀n 0 )(f (ḡn) = 0) 1 otherwise .
Define F 2 f (g) as n + 1 if n is minimal such that f (ḡn) > 0, and 0 if there is no such n. Note that F f is readily defined from f (in terms of µ 2 ) inside ACA ω 0 , and note that if F f (h) > 0 andḡF f (h) =hF f (h), then F f (g) = F f (h). Let Ξ be such that LIN(Ξ), and consider the following formula S(f ) = 0 ↔ (∃i 0 )(F f (Ξ(F f )(i)) = 0).
2)
The reverse direction in (4.2) is immediate by the definition of F f . For the forward direction, assume S(f ) = 0 and let g 1 satisfy (∀n 0 )(f (ḡn) = 0), i.e. F f (g) = 0. As observed above, if F f (h) > 0, we have g ∈ [hF f (h)]; hence if F f (h n ) > 0 for all n ∈ N where h n = Ξ(F f )(n), the corresponding countable subset of the covering induced by F f will not be a covering. Thus F f (Ξ(F f )(n)) = 0 must hold for some n, i.e. the right-hand side of (4.2) follows. Finally, (4.2) clearly characterises S(f ) in terms of µ, f and Ξ (via a term in Gödel's T ), and we are done.
The reader can readily verify that the proof in the theorem also goes through using intuitionistic logic. Combining the previous theorems, we get the following. Proof. Given such Ξ, there are terms t 1 , t 2 such that SCF(t 1 (Ξ, µ)) (i.e. Θ is given by t 1 (Ξ, µ)), and S = 2 t 2 (Ξ, µ). Checking the details of the proof of Theorem 4.2 and the construction of G F , we see that there is a term t 3 such that G F (f ) = t 3 (F, f, S, µ). Since S(F ) is primitive recursive in Θ(G F ), the theorem follows.
Remark 4.16 (On predicativist mathematics). We have discussed the compatibility problem for Nelson's predicative arithmetic (and its negative answer) in Section 1.2.3. We now argue that Theorems 4.12 and 4.13 settle the compatibility problem for Weyl-Feferman predicative mathematics in the negative. To this end, we exhibit two fairly natural theorems A and B which are both acceptable in predicative mathematics but A ∧ B is not. In a nutshell, ATR 0 is considered the 'upper limit' of predicative mathematics; both RCA ω 0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) and ACA ω 0 fall 'well below' this upper limit, while the combination ACA ω 0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) falls 'well above' the upper limit. Hence, each of the former systems is acceptable in predicative mathematics, but the combination is not. A more detailed discussion, for those familiar with the technical details, is as follows.
First of all, we elaborate on the notion of 'acceptable in predicative mathematics'. On one hand there is Feferman's notion of predicative provability ( [18, 21] ), which is rather limited and clumsy when dealing with ordinary mathematics, according to Simpson ( [67, p. 154] ). On the other hand, the weaker notion of predicative reducibility is more flexible: a formal system T is predicatively reducible if -intuitively speaking-it is not stronger than a system S which is predicatively provable. Thus, while T may involve impredicative notions, the latter are 'safe' from the point of view of predicative mathematics as these notions only provide as much strength/power as S, and the latter's 'predicative status' is well-known.
Secondly, Feferman and Schütte have shown (independently) that the least nonpredicatively provable ordinal is Γ 0 (See [21, p. 607] for details and references). Hence, a formal system T is called predicatively reducible if its ordinal |T | satisfies |T | < Γ 0 . Note that |ATR 0 | = Γ 0 , which motivates the status of ATR 0 as the upper limit of predicative mathematics. Now, the proof-theoretic ordinal of RCA ω 0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) (resp. ACA ω 0 ) is ω ω (resp. ε 0 ) by Theorem 4.12 (resp. [59, Theorem 2.2]) and [68, IX.5] . Since ω ω < ε 0 < Γ 0 , both these systems are predicatively reducible. By contrast, the combination of these systems, namely ACA ω 0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) implies Π 1 1 -CA 0 by Theorem 4.13, and the ordinal for the latter system is far beyond Γ 0 . We refer to [68, IX.5] for background concerning the cited results and further references.
Finally, we believe there to be many purely logical statements C and D that are predicatively reducible, while C ∧ D is not. Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, our result as in Theorem 4.13 is unique in that it provides two fairly natural theorems A and B that are predicatively reducible, while A ∧ B is not. As a bonus, the proof of Theorem 4.13 also goes through using only intuitionistic logic. While LIN 4 is fairly natural, the same is not immediately clear for (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ), though a case can be made: Ξ is essentially a realiser for paracompactness (as shown in [61] ), and the latter seems to be essential for proving metrisation theorems, as suggested by the results in [45, Lemma 4.10] .
